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Abstract 
 
In this work, we analyze if and to what extent financial literacy has an impact on workers’ retirement 
decisions. We do so with reference to Italy, a country that has undergone important pension reforms in the 
last two decades. We use the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) in the period 2006 to 2010, 
for which we have information on financial literacy. Our findings show that financially literate workers are 
more inclined to postpone retirement when they are (at least partially) enrolled in a DC scheme, Conversely, 
financial literacy does not seem to affect the retirement plans of workers who  are still covered by the more 
generous DB formula. 
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1. Introduction 
The links between financial knowledge and households’ behavior in various fields, such as 
consumption and saving, the choice of education and performance in the labor market have recently attracted 
much attention by both research and policy-making. Understanding the role of financial illiteracy in 
explaining why (some) people save too little for their retirement, or take on too much debt, make poor 
mortgage decisions or experience other financial problems is very important because illiteracy can be 
remedied, even if it takes time. Indeed, financial literacy can be seen as a necessary tool - certainly not 
sufficient - to create a less unequal playing field in the economic sphere.  
In the field of retirement wealth, the pension reforms of last few decades have generally increased 
both the individual responsibility and the complexity of the formulae that determine benefits. The binary 
transition from Defined Benefit (DB) to Defined Contribution (DC) pension formulae and from PayGo to 
more funding reflects these important changes. In this increasingly complex environment, understanding the 
basic financial issues has become very important, as a basis to avoid major mistakes and improve choices.  
This paper is centered on the relationship between financial (il)literacy and retirement decisions. 
More specifically, we investigate whether financial literacy affects the decisions of eligible people to 
postpone their retirement.  
We take Italy as our case study because of three main reasons: i) its unhappy position in the financial 
literacy ranking among rich countries (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011); ii) its significant gender and 
geographical heterogeneity, which allows us to investigate different types of behavior; iii) its pension system 
(mainly public and PayGo) is undergoing a transition from a rather generous DB formula towards a much 
less favorable DC one. While the first contained an “implicit” tax on the continuation of work and induced 
people to retire at the lowest possible age, the second, in consequence of its (almost) actuarial neutrality, 
allows for greater flexibility in the age of retirement (Belloni and Maccheroni, 2013). 
From a methodological perspective, we use a linear probability model with individual fixed effects. 
We apply the model to a sample drawn from the Survey of Household Income and Wealth, run by the Bank 
of Italy, which provides a suitable longitudinal dataset containing, in the period 2006-2010, a specific section 
on financial literacy.     
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2. How important is financial literacy for savings formation 
and management?  
The standard economic model of wealth accumulation posits that consumption decisions are taken in 
the life cycle framework, where consumption smoothing requires an individual to save during his/her 
working life to support consumption in retirement. To adequately perform this reallocation of resources, the 
worker should have a basic knowledge of concepts like present discounted values, nominal versus real 
variables, risk diversification; she should also be able to conjecture future labor incomes, social security 
benefits, retirement age, and survival probabilities. These prerequisites for rational choices are inherently 
complex and demanding, and hardly met empirically. That is why, at least in the public pension system, the 
most crucial decisions, starting with participation and the level of the contribution rate, have traditionally 
been compulsory, with no or very little discretion left to the individual. The age of retirement, on the other 
hand, has generally allowed for some flexibility - with, for example, an option to “early” retirement as a 
substitute for the “normal” retirement age. It is, however, a known fact that the exploitation of an early 
retirement option may cause the pension benefit to be too low later on, particularly in systems that have 
downgraded indexation from nominal wages to prices (as it occurred in most European countries).  
In private pensions, the degree of freedom has traditionally been much greater, for example with 
respect to portfolio choices (absent in public pay-as-you-go systems). Although it is likely that people who 
voluntarily participate in private pensions are financially literate and thus more aware of the implications of 
their choices, this should however not be taken for granted.   
Empirical research has demonstrated the strong association (not, or not yet, “causation”) between 
financial literacy and households’ financial well-being, through the adoption of a wide range of better 
strategies for wealth formation and management. These include: planning for retirement and life insurance 
coverage (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007b; Van Rooij et al., 2007; Luciano et al. 2016); stock market 
participation (Guiso and Jappelli 2008); portfolio diversification (Kimball and Shumway 2007); avoidance of 
over-indebtedness (Lusardi and Tufano, 2009); participation in private supplementary pension plans 
(Fornero and Monticone, 2011).  
Research has also shown the bad consequences of financial illiteracy. For example, Lusardi and 
Tufano (2009) show that people with a low level of financial literacy tend to enter into high-cost 
transactions. Van Rooij et al. (2007) document that a limited knowledge of stocks, bonds, risk diversification 
and, in general, of the working of financial markets implies a significantly lower propensity to invest in 
riskier/more rewarding assets, like stocks.  
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Moreover, a compelling body of evidence has demonstrated that some socio-demographic groups 
(typically, women older people and) are systematically more at risk of bad choices than other groups1. 
Because of these empirical results, various institutions are promoting initiatives to reduce illiteracy and 
support a better understanding of financial matters by citizens (OECD and PACFL, 2008). 
We would like to add to the existing literature by exploring how financial literacy affects the 
retirement decision of eligible workers. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study specifically 
devoted to the topic. 
 
3. Italy as an interesting case study 
Italy is a country with one of the oldest populations in the world: in 2014, the country occupied the 
fifth position, internationally, for the median age (44.5), after Monaco (51.1), Germany and Japan (46.1) and 
Saint Pierre and Miquelon (44.6). Projections of old age dependency ratios show one of the largest increases 
(from the 34 of 2014 to 70 of 2050)2. While longevity is steadily increasing, fertility is one of the lowest 
(1.42 children per woman)3. Confronted with these structural demographic changes, an ill designed pension 
system was hardly sustainable.   
The political awareness of the unsustainability of pension promises started in the late Eighties and 
brought a series of reforms, which opened in the 1992 financial emergency, when the lira came under a 
speculative attack and Italy was forced to temporarily leave the European Monetary System (EMS). Social 
opposition imposed, however, an exasperatingly slow phasing in of the new rules (a less generous DB 
formula and restrictions to early retirement), so that three years later, in 1995, further restructuring was 
required. An NDC Swedish-style system was then adopted, but the pace of the reform continued to be 
impossibly slow, which implied transferring almost the entire adjustment burden to the young and future 
generations. Further piecemeal adjustments – some advancing on the reform path, some retreating - were  
introduced in subsequent years, spanning from stricter eligibility criteria to increases in payroll tax rates, 
from the abolition of the possibility to cumulate earnings and pension benefits to equalization of retirement 
ages of men and women in the public sector. This very long transition coupled with swift population aging 
reduced the beneficial effects on public finances and  aggravated the effect of the sovereign debt crisis that 
hit the euro area — and Italy in particular — in summer/autumn of 2011, when a new reform was strongly 
advocated by international institutions.  
A technocratic government, called in to overcome the political impasse, enacted the 2011 reform. 
The new reform had to be radical, with very short phasing-in period. It had to realize immediate savings in 
                                                     
1
 See Lusardi and Mitchell, 2013, for a survey.  
2
 Projected number of persons aged 65 and over as a percentage of the projected number of persons aged between 15 
and 64. According to Eurostat data, Italy will pass from 32.66 in 2013 to 53 in 2050 and to 57 in 2080.  
3
 CIA World Fact book 
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pension expenditure and to provide for the demographic transition by reducing the burden on the young and 
future generations; it had to correct the inequities and the distortions still embedded in the system (like the 
“implicit tax” on the continuation of work after reaching the minimum age/seniority requirements). The 
reform speeded up the transition to the NDC system by extending to all workers (including members of 
Parliament), as of January 1, 2012, the DC method of benefit calculation. This was very important to restore 
credibility to the formula, still largely unfamiliar to the public and considered “too severe” (or too 
transparent?) by politicians. In terms of parametric changes, the reform significantly raised statutory 
retirement ages and almost canceled the “seniority pensions”, awarded according to years of work, almost 
irrespective of age; it aligned, as of 2018, the retirement ages of women to those of men; and it indexed all 
retirement requisites to changes in life expectancy (Fornero 2015).  
The reform process haa progressively tightened the eligibility conditions. From an initial situation 
which de facto encouraged early retirement (men and women could retire at any age with 35 years of 
seniority or at ages 60/55, respectively, having worked 15 years) regulation established subsequent increases 
in both age and seniority, or in their combination, and introduced incentives to postpone retirement. These 
changes in retirement requirements went in parallel with the change in the pension formula from a generous 
DB to a more actuarially neutral DC one.  
For the purpose of this study, an exact description of the whole transition is not necessary. Given our 
dataset, we are interested in rules characterizing retirement in the period 2006-2010. Table 1A of the 
appendix summarizes the rather complex normative framework. In simple words, this could be described as 
the passage from a situation in which retirement at the earliest possible age was (and was known) to be the 
most convenient choice to a situation in which, because of the increasing relevance of the DC formula, 
postponing retirement could, from an economic point of view, be the right decision. We thus expect that 
more financially literate people who are eligible to retire at least partly under the DC system tend to postpone 
their exit from the labor market. 
Looking at the other side of the thread, i.e. financial literacy levels, Fornero and Monticone  (2011), 
again using SHIW data, show that most Italians lack knowledge of basic concepts such as interest rates and 
inflation and that, in term of differentiation, men, the more educated, and residents in the Centre–North 
possess higher financial literacy.  As for the young generations (i.e. the future generations of retirees), the 
picture does not as well look reassuring. Italy’s performance is below the average of the 13 OECD countries 
(PISA 2012). More than one in five students in Italy does not reach the baseline level of proficiency in 
financial literacy. Overall, Italy’s performance in financial literacy is lower than might be expected, based on 
students’ skills in mathematics and reading. This is particularly true among students with a strong 
performance in mathematics. This evidence suggests that the core skills students acquire in school do not 
include financial literacy.    
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4. Data and descriptive statistics 
For our empirical analysis, we use SHIW data from 2006 to 2010, and take into account family 
heads that have become eligible for retirement and may or may not have retired. Table 1 reports the relevant 
descriptive statistics of our sample.  
Considering the retirement age, both the actual and the expected one increase over time (the latter 
more than the former). The average retirement age is 58 over the whole period, while the expected one 
moves up from 62.8 to 63.8 years. This may reflect the progressive tightening of the access requirements, as 
imposed by the reforms. 
As for labor income and wealth, the first is quite stable over the period, while the second increases 
moderately (3.6 per cent).  Retirement income experiences the highest increase (9.7 per cent). 
As for the replacement ratio, the actual one reached 73.5 per cent, on average, over the period. In 
terms of expectation, both its lower value of 65 per cent and its decrease of 2 percentage points over the 
years 2006-10 reflect workers’ awareness of the restrictive effects of the reforms.  
 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics panel 2006-2010 
2006 Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Retirement age 2405 58 5 
Expected retirement age 3473 62 5 
Wealth 6544 255126 582704 
Income 6480 23097 22485 
Retirement income 2404 976 466 
Replacement rate 2393 73 16 
Expected replacement rate 3473 66 17 
 
2008 Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Retirement age 2502 58 5 
Expected retirement age 3458 63 4 
Wealth 6664 250522 531941 
Income 6600 23112 18251 
Retirement income 2502 1091 993 
Replacement rate 2495 73 16 
Expected replacement rate 3458 65 16 
 
2010 Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Retirement age 2364 58 5 
Expected retirement age 3324 63 4 
Wealth 6666 264426 440119 
Income 6580 23111 18491 
Retirement income 2364 1071 546 
Replacement rate 2360 73 16 
Expected replacement rate 3316 64 15 
Source: Our calculations using SHIW data 
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We define ‘eligible’ those workers who meet the (variable, as we have seen) conditions for 
retirement in each particular year. Their number is around 2.6 thousands in all years; of them only a fraction 
varying from 6.8 to 11.4 per cent was still working. 
 
Table 2 Eligible people panel 2006-2010 
Eligible people  Years   
 2006 2008 2010 Total 
Still working 252 179 294 725 
 34.76 24.69 40.55 100.00 
 9.70 6.83 11.45 9.31 
Eligible and retired 2345 2443 2273 7061 
 33.21 34.60 32.19 100.00 
 90.30 93.17 88.55 90.69 
Total 2597 2622 2567 7786 
 33.35 33.68 32.97 100.00 
 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Our calculations using SHIW data 
 
When analyzing gender differences, Table 3 shows that women represent 28 per cent of the sample 
in 2006, but only 6.6 per cent of these women decided to postpone retirement, a much lower proportion than 
observed in men (11 per cent). The numbers support the hypothesis that men and women may have behaved 
differently with respect to retirement. We also see that the gap decreases over time, with women overtaking 
man in 2010 (11.8 against 11. 2 per cent).    
 
 
Table 3 Eligible by gender panel 2006-2010, by percentage 
Eligible 2006 2008 2010 
 Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total 
Still working 80.95 19.05 100.00 65.92 34.08 100.00 64.63 35.37 100.00 
 10.93 6.58 9.70 6.36 7.94 6.83 11.26 11.83 11.45 
Retired 70.92 29.08 100.00 71.06 28.94 100.00 65.90 34.10 100.00 
 89.07 93.42 90.30 93.64 92.06 93.17 88.74 88.17 88.55 
Total 71.89 28.11 100.00 70.71 29.29 100.00 65.76 34.24 100.00 
 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Source: Our calculations using SHIW data 
 
We also controlled for geographical areas, and found no significant difference between North and 
South. 
In order to analyze the way in which expectations about retirement differ from the actual result, we 
study the effective and expected replacement ratios by gender and regions. Table 4 shows that expectations 
decrease over time for both women and men, and that women have lower expectations across all years (a fact 
that can be explained by the lower average seniority and the persisting wage gap in the labor market).    
Men’s expected ratios, on the other hand, decrease more than women’s. 
 
Table 4 Expected replacement ratios, by gender panel 2006-2010 
 Expected replacement rate 
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 Male Female 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
2006 2581 66.42 17.37 892 64.93 16.34 
2008 2494 65.76 16.18 964 63.08 16.62 
2010 2115 64.74 15.62 1201 63.32 14.63 
Source: Our calculations using SHIW data 
 
Comparing the previous expected ratios with retirees’ effective ones, we confirm women’s lower 
average replacement ratios, both in realizations and in expectations, with the former greater than the second. 
Table 5 shows that men’s replacement ratios are higher by 3 or 4 percentage points than women’s, while the 
gap in expectations is about 2 percentage points. Finally, the replacement ratio for men decreases year by 
year, while it increases for women, suggesting a slight convergence. 
 
Table 5 Replacement ratios, by gender panel 2006-2010 
 Replacement rate 
 
 Male Female 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
2006 1704 74.77 15.81 689 70.40 17.84 
2008 1777 74.29 15.91 718 71.61 17.83 
2010 1561 74.27 16.38 799 71.30 16.88 
Source: Our calculations using SHIW data 
 
Considering the geographic areas, the Centre and the North show respectively the highest and the 
lowest expected replacement rate (Table 6); in terms of realizations, the Centre (Table 7) has always the 
highest value, while the South has the lowest.   
 
Table 6 Expected replacement ratios by geographic area, panel 2006-2010 
 Expected replacement ratios 
 
 Northern region Central region Southern region 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
2006 1833 64.43 17.12 660 68.81 16.90 980 67.18 16.95 
2008 1757 63.73 16.06 645 68.92 17.28 1056 64.75 15.87 
2010 1597 63.23 15.19 724 64.79 16.68 995 65.42 14.24 
Source: Our calculations using SHIW data 
 
 
Table 7 Replacement ratios by geographic area, panel 2006-2010 
 Replacement ratios 
 
 Northern region Central region Southern region 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
2006 1214 73.26 16.46 549 75.07 15.93165 630 72.64 17.13 
2008 1276 74.61 16.47 584 75.67 16.43607 635 69.34 16.01 
2010 1197 73.82 16.75 540 74.55 16.93573 623 71.07 15.84 
Source: Our calculations using SHIW data 
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5. How Financially Literate are Italians?   
In order to measure the degree of financial literacy, we consider three of the six financial literacy 
tests included in the SHIW. Following Fornero and Monticone (2011), we select the tests on inflation rate, 
interest rate and mortgage from the 2006 questionnaire. However, we replace the question about the interest 
rates with the question on investment risk since the former is missing in both the 2008 and 2010 surveys. 
 
Table 8 reports the answers to the various questions for each year. We can see that, possibly because 
of direct experience, Italian households are knowledgeable about inflation and mortgage, with respectively 
72 and 64 per cent of correct answers. As for investment risk, the share of correct answers falls to 50 per 
cent, which is mirrored by Italian households’ low propensity to hold stocks. For the question on interest 
rates, only 41 per cent of people gave the correct answer. Overall, the performance over time is improving, 
which could be partly due to greater exposure to financial information in con sequence of the financial crisis. 
 
Table 8 Financial literacy panel 2006-2010, by percentage 
 Years  
Inflation rate 2006 2008 2010 Total 
Exactly same amount 15.68 32.62 51.71 100.00 
 3.69 3.87 6.14 4.74 
Less (correct) 17.71 41.64 40.66 100.00 
 63.20 74.95 73.16 71.87 
More 36.51 34.43 29.07 100.00 
 6.28 2.99 2.52 3.46 
Don't know 27.97 37.58 34.45 100.00 
 26.84 18.19 16.67 19.32 
No answer 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
 0.00 0.00 1.52 0.61 
Total 20.14 39.93 39.94 100.00 
 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
 
 Years   
Mortgage  2006 2008 2010 Total 
Variable rate mortgage 15.63 36.59 47.78 100.00 
 3.66 4.32 5.64 4.72 
Fixed rate mortgage (correct) 17.67 42.83 39.50 100.00 
 56.44 69.00 63.62 64.32 
Variable rate mortgage 23.09 31.64 45.27 100.00 
 9.73 6.72 9.62 8.48 
Don't know 28.19 36.98 34.83 100.00 
 30.17 19.96 18.80 21.55 
No answer 0.00 0.00 100.00 100.00 
 0.00 0.00 2.33 0.93 
Total 20.14 39.93 39.94 100.00 
 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
 Years  
Risk 2008 2010 Total 
One company shares (correct) 45.26 54.74 100.00 
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 45.35 54.83 50.09 
Shares of several companies 56.93 43.07 100.00 
 28.68 21.69 25.18 
Don't know 57.74 42.26 100.00 
 25.98 19.01 22.49 
No answer 0.00 100.00 100.00 
 0.00 4.47 2.24 
Total 49.99 50.01 100.00 
 100.00 100.00 100.00 
 
Interest rate 2006 
Less than 1,020 8.03 
 100.00 
Exactly 1,020 25.97 
 100.00 
More than 1,020 (correct) 41.06 
 100.00 
Don't know 24.93 
 100.00 
Total 100.00 
 100.00 
Source: Our calculations using SHIW data 
 
Table 9 reports the overall performance by gender: the percentage answering all the questions 
correctly increases between 2006 and 2010 by 9 points, while the percentage of “Don’t know” decreases by 
10 points. The performance of both men and women improves over time, with women’s financial knowledge 
progressing more than men: in 2006, only 18 per cent of women answered all the questions correctly, while 
20 per cent answered “Don’t know” to all questions; in 2010, the corresponding numbers were 31 per cent (+ 
12 percentage points), and 5 per cent (-13 % points). Not surprisingly, since finance has traditionally been a 
male “domain” (Boggio et al. 2014), men score better in all tests; however, their progress is slower, 
suggesting that women will bridge the gap. 
 
Table 9 Overall performance by gender panel 2006-2010, by percentage 
2006 Gender  
 Male Female Total 
All correct 76.21 23.79 100.00 
 28.79 18.10 25.25 
All “Don’t know” 55.79 44.21 100.00 
 12.86 20.52 15.40 
 
2008 Gender  
 Male Female Total 
All correct 70.35 29.65 100.00 
 35.97 29.33 33.70 
All “Don’t know” 55.90 44.10 100.00 
 7.88 12.02 9.29 
 
2010 Gender  
 Male Female Total 
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All correct 62.27 37.73 100.00 
 38.01 30.76 34.91 
All “Don’t know” 44.30 55.70 100.00 
 4.59 7.71 5.93 
Source: Our calculations using SHIW data 
 
Geographic differences are noticeable, with a gap unfavorable to Southern regions, with respect to 
both Northern and Central ones, which perform better in all years. Central Italy shows not only the highest 
proportion of people correctly answering all questions, but also the fastest progress (the percentage passing 
from 30 per cent in 20006 to 48 in 2010). The North is second and progresses more slowly over time, 
passing from 28 to 33 per cent. The respective figures for the South are 17 and 29 per cent, implying an 
intermediate increase in literacy.    
 Looking at the proportion of “Don’t know” to all questions, the South shows the highest figure and 
the North the lowest; all figures, moreover, decrease confirming the improvement in financial literacy.    
 
Table 10 Financial literacy by geographic area panel 2006-2010, by percentage 
 Geographic area  
2006 North Center South Total 
All correct 55.01 23.56 21.44 100.00 
 28.49 30.30 17.11 25.25 
All “Don’t know” 41.31 17.18 41.51 100.00 
 13.06 13.48 20.21 15.40 
 
 Geographic area  
2008 North Center South Total 
All correct 47.86 26.98 25.16 100.00 
 33.56 44.96 26.74 33.70 
All “Don’t know” 28.27 22.29 49.43 100.00 
 5.46 10.24 14.48 9.29 
 
 Geographic area  
2010 North Center South Total 
All correct 43.06 29.22 27.72 100.00 
 33.17 48.12 28.90 34.91 
All “Don’t know” 28.35 21.27 50.38 100.00 
 3.71 5.94 8.92 5.93 
Source: Our calculations using SHIW data 
 
Table 11 is particularly significant for investigating whether financial literacy affects the decision to 
retire. It displays the retirement choices of eligible people by gender and financial literacy, across the years. 
For example, in 2006, 35 per cent of eligible but still working people answer all the questions correctly, 
while among retired people this percentage decreases to 21 per cent. Therefore, it seems that individuals who 
decide to work instead of retiring are more financially literate. This is true for all years. 
With respect to gender, men perform better than women irrespective of their retirement choice, with 
a gap that is narrowing over time.  This is especially true for eligible people who are still working: among 
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these, the share of women answering all the questions correctly increases by 19 percentage points from 2006 
to 2010, while, among those who are retired, it increases by 9 points. 
 
Table 11 Retirement decisions by gender and financial literacy panel 2006-2010, by percentage 
2006 Gender  
 Male Female Total 
Eligible but still 
working: 
   
All correct 90.70 9.30 100.00 
 38.24 20.00 35.25 
All “Don’t know” 50.00 50.00 100.00 
 4.90 25.00 8.20 
Eligible and retired:    
All correct 78.95 21.05 100.00 
 23.67 15.16 21.17 
All “Don’t know” 55.60 44.40 100.00 
 18.69 35.86 23.74 
 
2008 Gender  
 Male Female Total 
Eligible but still 
working: 
   
All correct 66.20 33.80 100.00 
 39.83 39.34 39.66 
All “Don’t know” 44.44 55.56 100.00 
 3.39 8.20 5.03 
Eligible and retired:    
All correct 79.82 20.18 100.00 
 30.99 19.24 27.59 
All “Don’t know” 61.34 38.66 100.00 
 12.62 19.52 14.61 
 
 
 
2010 Gender  
 Male Female Total 
Eligible but still working:    
All correct 65.25 34.75 100.00 
 40.53 39.42 40.14 
All “Don’t know” 37.50 62.50 100.00 
 1.58 4.81 2.72 
Eligible and retired:    
All correct 73.16 26.84 100.00 
 33.85 24.00 30.49 
All “Don’t know” 49.75 50.25 100.00 
 6.68 13.03 8.84 
Source: Our calculations using SHIW data 
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6. Methodology 
We want to estimate the effect of financial literacy ( ) on the retirement decision (  of older 
workers, but under 75 years old, who are eligible for retirement. Our dependent variable is a dummy taking 
value 1 when the individual has decided to retire and 0 otherwise. Financial literacy is measured using five 
dummy variables: 
 
- All correct: taking value 1 when the individual answers all the questions correctly 
- One correct: taking value 1 when the individual answers one question correctly 
- Two corrects: taking value 1 when the individual answers two questions correctly 
- All “Don’t know”: taking value 1 when the individual answers “Don’t know” to all the questions  
- All wrong: taking value 1 when the individual answers all the questions wrongly 
 
We use a linear probability model with fixed effects, an empirical strategy that allows us to control for 
individual and time-invariant characteristics that we are not able to observe. The model is the following: 
 
                                                  (1) 
with:                                                                      
 
where  is an unobserved variable that varies among individuals but does not change over time, capturing 
the unobserved individual characteristics. 
We want to estimate : the effect of financial literacy on the decision by people aged less than 75 
years to retire, given the access requirements, keeping the unobserved individual characteristics constant.  
Since we have five different variables measuring financial literacy, we are going to estimate five 
different regressions in order to be able to select the most significant one. We control for some individual 
and socio-economic variables: age, age squared, partner’s work, gender, occupation, education, replacement 
rate, and individual income; as a measure of wealth, we use the value of the individual’s real and financial 
assets. 
Descriptive statistics suggest a possible presence of gender and geographical differences in the 
results. However, the fixed effect methodology does not enable us to include a gender and/or geographical 
dummy because they are individual and time-invariant variables and the model already takes them into 
account. Therefore, we estimate the regressions again, reducing the sample to only men, only women, and 
only people in the northern, then the central, and then the southern regions. From the results, we can provide 
evidence for differences between men, women and regions in retirement decisions and in the way they are 
influenced by financial literacy.  
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7. Estimation results 
Table 12 shows the results. The first regression estimates the effect of socio-economic variables; we 
then introduce the financial literacy variables. We run these regressions first for the whole sample, and then 
by gender and geographic area.  
The sample we use consists of 3407 observations. Once we introduce financial literacy variables, the 
sample lowers to 2942 observations. With respect to the whole sample, the first regression shows that 
becoming older increases the probability of retiring, while being self-employed is positively associated with 
postponing retirement; these two variables remain statistically significant in all model specifications. As 
expected, getting divorced extends the time spent in the labor market, probably because of the costs (both 
monetary and psychological) connected with divorce. This effect is quite strong, and it remains stable in all 
specifications. Having offspring increases the probability of retiring (a “grandparent effect”? Coda 
Moscarola et al 2015; Calcagno at al 2016). Unfortunately, this variable loses its significance as we 
introduce financial literacy variables. 
The probability of retirement declines with income, possibly reflecting the lower disutility of 
working associated with higher labor income. Conversely, an increment in financial wealth is statistically 
associated with a greater probability of retiring. Both variables are statistically significant in all 
specifications. 
Considering the financial literacy variables, only the dummy acquiring value 1 when the individual 
answers all questions correctly is significant, at the 5 per cent level. These are the people who are more likely 
to retire. Moreover, in the specifications with financial literacy, three other variables become statistically 
significant: widows are more likely to retire, people with a middle school diploma tend to remain longer in 
the labor market and, finally, a higher replacement ratio is associated with a higher probability of retiring. 
We controlled also for other educational levels, but they were not significant. 
 
 
Table 12 Impact of financial literacy on decision to retire, linear probability model with fixed effect 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Retired Retired Retired Retired Retired Retired 
Age 0.288*** 0.328*** 0.322*** 0.324*** 0.320*** 0.322*** 
 (0.047) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Age^2 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Self-employed -0.119** -0.158** -0.160** -0.159** -0.160** -0.160** 
 (0.055) (0.071) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) 
Partner with job -0.065 -0.080 -0.075 -0.076 -0.073 -0.074 
 (0.048) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062) (0.062) 
Marital status 0.116 0.243* 0.249* 0.245* 0.251* 0.248* 
 (0.106) (0.128) (0.131) (0.131) (0.133) (0.132) 
Widow/widower 0.108 0.240** 0.247** 0.244** 0.249** 0.246** 
 (0.113) (0.120) (0.123) (0.123) (0.124) (0.124) 
Divorced -0.242** -0.165* -0.161* -0.160* -0.153 -0.159* 
 (0.114) (0.094) (0.094) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) 
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Offspring 0.045* 0.033 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.036 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
No. of family members -0.000 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010 -0.009 
 (0.021) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) 
Primary school -0.016 -0.057 -0.060 -0.063 -0.061 -0.063 
 (0.072) (0.092) (0.089) (0.090) (0.090) (0.089) 
Middle school -0.075 -0.150* -0.167** -0.162* -0.172** -0.169** 
 (0.058) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) 
High school -0.038 -0.056 -0.068 -0.070 -0.071 -0.072 
 (0.033) (0.051) (0.052) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051) 
University -0.089 -0.031 -0.045 -0.040 -0.050 -0.046 
 (0.066) (0.090) (0.090) (0.085) (0.090) (0.087) 
Replacement rate 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log of real wealth 0.000 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.011 
 (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Log of financial wealth 0.024*** 0.023** 0.023** 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023** 
 (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Log of individual income -0.118*** -0.093* -0.092* -0.093* -0.091* -0.092* 
 (0.043) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
All correct answers  0.038**     
  (0.017)     
One correct answer   -0.022    
   (0.016)    
Two correct answers    -0.016   
    (0.014)   
All “Don’t know”     0.037  
     (0.027)  
All wrong answers      0.009 
      (0.021) 
Constant -8.331*** -10.088*** -9.933*** -9.949*** -9.888*** -9.903*** 
 (1.697) (2.092) (2.091) (2.100) (2.096) (2.099) 
       
Observations 4,758 3,920 3,920 3,920 3,920 3,920 
R-squared 0.130 0.151 0.148 0.147 0.147 0.146 
Number of pid 3,407 2,942 2,942 2,942 2,942 2,942 
Standard errors in parentheses. ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
 
 
 
 
The fact that financially literate individuals have a greater propensity for retirement can be 
reconciled with the application of the DB formula, which penalizes the continuation of work after having 
reached the minimum requirement. In other words, people seem to correctly understand the disincentive 
(reduction of their pension wealth, irrespective of the increase in the pension benefit4) to go on working and 
tend to leave.   
Conversely, allowing for greater actuarial neutrality under a  (pro rata or full) DC formula, we 
should expect less influence of financial literacy. Retirement should in these cases reflect personal 
preferences more than an economic gain. The worker is freer to choose on personal/family elements, like 
having other activities in which being involved, a preference for traveling and so on.  
                                                     
4
 The reduction (so-called implicit tax on the continuation of work) is due to the fact that the increase in the pension 
benefit is not enough to pay for the extra year of contributions and year of lost pensions.  
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Tables 13 and 14 report results by gender. The first table refers to the regressions on the sample of 
men, and the second to the sample of women. 
As for women, almost all the variables lose their significance, and in particular none of those 
measuring financial literacy are significant. The same is true of men. The female sample differs from the 
male one in that having offspring is statistically associated with a higher probability of retirement. This could 
mean that women give more weight to their role as mothers/grandmothers.  
As for men, being self-employed is significantly associated with a lower probability of retiring, 
while, again, being divorced increases the likelihood of remaining in the labor market. Having a working 
partner encourages men to continue to work: having a partner who is active in the labor market probably has 
a positive spillover effect on their willingness to work, while not having a partner could induce to stay longer 
in the labor market. Becoming older is significantly associated with retiring only for men. 
 
 
Table 13 Linear probability model with fixed effects for men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Male Retired Male Retired Male Retired Male Retired Male Retired Male Retired 
Age 0.316*** 0.403*** 0.401*** 0.402*** 0.400*** 0.402*** 
 (0.046) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060) 
Age^2 -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Self-employed -0.154*** -0.212*** -0.215*** -0.216*** -0.217*** -0.216*** 
 (0.041) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) 
Partner with job -0.083** -0.079* -0.074* -0.075* -0.073* -0.074* 
 (0.035) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Marital status 0.158 0.137 0.147 0.139 0.144 0.141 
 (0.113) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) 
Widower 0.149 0.111 0.127 0.114 0.119 0.119 
 (0.133) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) (0.147) 
Divorced -0.406*** -0.424*** -0.415*** -0.425*** -0.420*** -0.426*** 
 (0.132) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) (0.143) 
Offspring 0.015 0.017 0.018 0.020 0.020 0.019 
 (0.026) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
No. of family members -0.006 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.021) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Primary school -0.063 -0.058 -0.062 -0.063 -0.062 -0.064 
 (0.073) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) 
Middle school -0.074 -0.151* -0.165** -0.161* -0.166** -0.161* 
 (0.062) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) (0.082) 
High school -0.042 -0.071 -0.083 -0.082 -0.083 -0.078 
 (0.097) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.118) 
University 0.008 0.075 0.060 0.060 0.058 0.064 
 (0.163) (0.304) (0.304) (0.305) (0.305) (0.305) 
Replacement rate 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log of real wealth -0.004 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Log of financial wealth 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Log of individual income -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.146*** -0.148*** -0.147*** -0.148*** 
 (0.031) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
All correct answers  0.031     
  (0.019)     
One correct answer   -0.021    
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   (0.021)    
Two correct answers    -0.008   
    (0.017)   
All “Don’t know”     0.019  
     (0.039)  
All wrong answers      -0.008 
      (0.032) 
Constant -8.900*** -11.967*** -11.926*** -11.932*** -11.900*** -11.938*** 
 (1.567) (2.027) (2.029) (2.030) (2.031) (2.031) 
       
Observations 3,457 2,820 2,820 2,820 2,820 2,820 
R-squared 0.159 0.220 0.218 0.217 0.217 0.217 
Number of pid 2,480 2,125 2,125 2,125 2,125 2,125 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 14 Linear probability model with fixed effect for women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Female 
Retired 
Female 
Retired 
Female 
Retired 
Female 
Retired 
Female 
Retired 
Female 
Retired 
Age 0.215*** 0.068 0.052 0.063 0.056 0.053 
 (0.071) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.083) (0.083) 
Age^2 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Self employed -0.007 0.003 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.009 
 (0.060) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
Partner with job 0.074 -0.029 -0.029 -0.024 -0.025 -0.027 
 (0.088) (0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.108) (0.108) 
Marital status -0.313 0.089 0.059 0.087 0.057 0.052 
 (0.215) (0.281) (0.281) (0.281) (0.280) (0.281) 
Widow -0.300 0.074 0.039 0.083 0.054 0.049 
 (0.197) (0.265) (0.265) (0.266) (0.264) (0.265) 
Divorced -0.230** 0.033 0.033 0.047 0.048 0.042 
 (0.108) (0.124) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) (0.125) 
Offspring 0.126*** 0.080* 0.081* 0.081* 0.082* 0.081* 
 (0.040) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) 
No. of family members 0.000 -0.018 -0.017 -0.023 -0.022 -0.019 
 (0.034) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Primary school 0.085 -0.012 -0.012 -0.020 -0.018 -0.013 
 (0.118) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) 
Middle school 0.075 0.039 0.017 0.018 0.023 0.004 
 (0.151) (0.195) (0.194) (0.194) (0.194) (0.194) 
High school 0.019 0.025 0.016 0.013 0.015 0.010 
 (0.096) (0.121) (0.121) (0.120) (0.120) (0.121) 
University -0.136 0.007 -0.001 0.023 -0.003 0.029 
 (0.147) (0.262) (0.262) (0.262) (0.261) (0.264) 
Replacement rate 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log of real wealth 0.007 0.031** 0.032** 0.030** 0.031** 0.031** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Log financial wealth 0.023** 0.015 0.014 0.017 0.016 0.016 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Log individual income -0.061 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.004 
 (0.039) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) 
All correct answers  0.034     
  (0.027)     
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One correct answers   -0.011    
   (0.026)    
Two correct answers    -0.029   
    (0.023)   
All “Don’t know”     0.062  
     (0.045)  
All wrong answers      0.036 
      (0.039) 
Constant -6.314*** -2.155 -1.609 -1.973 -1.810 -1.654 
 (2.426) (2.853) (2.824) (2.833) (2.818) (2.820) 
Observations 1,301 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 
R-squared 0.118 0.055 0.050 0.055 0.056 0.053 
Number of pid 927 817 817 817 817 817 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
Assets seem to influence differently the retirement decisions of men and women. The latter are   
sensitive to increments in real estate (a higher preference for homeownership?), while men’s decisions to 
retire are significantly and positively affected by both financial wealth and labor income. The replacement 
ratio is also positively associated with retirement. Finally, education (mid-school diploma) is negatively 
correlated to retirement. We estimated the same regressions for the northern, central, and southern regions. 
Financial literacy variables matter only in the central region; in particular, those giving all correct answers 
tend to postpone their retirement, while those giving two correct answers adopt the opposite behavior, and 
are more likely to exit. 
In the North, becoming older is statistically and positively associated with retirement; also, an 
increment in the replacement ratio increases the probability of retiring. In southern and central regions, only 
the relationship between retirement and age is significant, while the replacement ratio loses its significance. 
Being self-employed delays retirement and the effect is statistically significant in the northern and central 
areas. Having a working partner is statistically significant only in the North, and has a negative sign. The 
level of education matters only in the north, where people having a middle school diploma are more likely to 
postpone retirement. In the south, the variables related to family are very important: being a widow or 
widower or being married increases the propensity to retire, while having a child extends the time spent in 
the labor market in the central region.  
Finally, considering the wealth and income variables, they are not at all significant in the central 
region. Increments in real estate are associated with a higher probability of retiring in the south and in 
financial wealth in the northern and southern regions (with respect to the latter, the result for real estate are 
significant at the 1 per cent level, while for financial assets are significant only at the 5 per cent level). 
Individual income acquires significance only in the north, and it is associated with a postponement of 
retirement. In particular, it is more statistically significant, with a 1 per cent significance level, than financial 
wealth, which gives a P-value of less than 5 per cent.  
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Table 15 Linear probability model with fixed effects for the north 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Retired in 
north  
Retired in 
north  
Retired in 
north  
Retired in 
north  
Retired in 
north  
Retired in 
north  
Age 0.301*** 0.371*** 0.368*** 0.367*** 0.368*** 0.366*** 
 (0.047) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Age^2 -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Self-employed -0.117** -0.134** -0.135** -0.136** -0.135** -0.134** 
 (0.046) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Partner with job -0.077* -0.089* -0.089* -0.089* -0.089* -0.088* 
 (0.042) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Marital status 0.106 0.120 0.122 0.119 0.121 0.123 
 (0.127) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) (0.130) 
Widow/widower 0.149 0.153 0.149 0.146 0.147 0.144 
 (0.126) (0.131) (0.132) (0.131) (0.131) (0.131) 
Divorced -0.054 -0.039 -0.043 -0.045 -0.046 -0.047 
 (0.112) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) (0.117) 
Offspring 0.014 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.027) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
No. of family members 0.016 -0.011 -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 
 (0.025) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
Primary school -0.024 0.042 0.030 0.026 0.023 0.030 
 (0.102) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132) 
Middle school -0.153* -0.316*** -0.334*** -0.337*** -0.336*** -0.334*** 
 (0.090) (0.114) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) (0.113) 
High school -0.052 -0.125 -0.137 -0.139 -0.140 -0.133 
 (0.088) (0.102) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) 
University -0.079 -0.206 -0.218 -0.219 -0.221 -0.238 
 (0.146) (0.266) (0.266) (0.267) (0.266) (0.267) 
Replacement rate 0.001* 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log of real wealth -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Log of financial wealth 0.020** 0.021** 0.021** 0.021** 0.020** 0.020** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Log of individual income -0.176*** -0.124*** -0.119*** -0.122*** -0.122*** -0.120*** 
 (0.035) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) 
All correct answers  0.024     
  (0.020)     
One correct answer   -0.012    
   (0.020)    
Two correct answers    -0.001   
    (0.016)   
All “Don’t know”     -0.020  
     (0.046)  
All wrong answers      -0.025 
      (0.033) 
Constant -8.089*** -10.921*** -10.829*** -10.798*** -10.801*** -10.775*** 
 (1.588) (1.972) (1.972) (1.972) (1.972) (1.971) 
Observations 2,604 2,121 2,121 2,121 2,121 2,121 
R-squared 0.149 0.201 0.200 0.199 0.199 0.200 
Number of pid 1,817 1,558 1,558 1,558 1,558 1,558 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0 
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Table 16 Linear probability model with fixed effect for central region 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Retired in 
central region 
Retired in 
central region 
Retired in 
central region 
Retired in 
central region 
Retired in 
central region 
Retired in 
central region 
Age 0.333*** 0.312*** 0.291** 0.304*** 0.291** 0.288** 
 (0.094) (0.114) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) (0.115) 
Age^2 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Self-employed -0.254*** -0.320*** -0.336*** -0.316*** -0.337*** -0.333*** 
 (0.069) (0.077) (0.078) (0.077) (0.077) (0.078) 
Partner with job -0.013 -0.045 -0.006 -0.036 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.064) (0.081) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) 
Marital status 0.059 0.199 0.242 0.227 0.270 0.258 
 (0.168) (0.234) (0.236) (0.234) (0.235) (0.236) 
Widow/widower 0.126 0.224 0.274 0.242 0.273 0.283 
 (0.211) (0.265) (0.267) (0.266) (0.266) (0.267) 
Divorced -0.465*** -0.228 -0.198 -0.168 -0.132 -0.157 
 (0.142) (0.181) (0.182) (0.180) (0.184) (0.184) 
Offspring 0.163*** 0.120** 0.130** 0.125** 0.138** 0.134** 
 (0.048) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) 
No. of family members -0.024 -0.027 -0.030 -0.025 -0.027 -0.029 
 (0.036) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
Primary school -0.066 -0.157 -0.153 -0.156 -0.152 -0.152 
 (0.100) (0.113) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) (0.114) 
Middle school -0.017 -0.056 -0.065 -0.049 -0.065 -0.062 
 (0.095) (0.132) (0.133) (0.132) (0.133) (0.133) 
High school 0.008 0.040 0.044 0.024 0.038 0.031 
 (0.134) (0.179) (0.180) (0.179) (0.180) (0.181) 
University -0.077 0.124 0.121 0.109 0.109 0.108 
 (0.185) (0.355) (0.358) (0.355) (0.357) (0.358) 
Replacement rate 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log of real wealth 0.005 0.026 0.027 0.029 0.026 0.029 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) 
Log of financial wealth 0.013 -0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.003 0.001 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Log of individual income -0.049 -0.036 -0.047 -0.029 -0.037 -0.042 
 (0.051) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
All correct answers  0.070**     
  (0.032)     
One correct answer   -0.041    
   (0.044)    
Two correct answer    -0.062*   
    (0.032)   
All “Don’t know”     0.104  
     (0.071)  
All wrong answers      0.050 
      (0.059) 
Constant -10.289*** -9.921** -9.206** -9.799** -9.420** -9.224** 
 (3.201) (3.842) (3.863) (3.849) (3.854) (3.865) 
Observations 1,114 938 938 938 938 938 
R-squared 0.194 0.205 0.191 0.202 0.196 0.190 
Number of pid 802 706 706 706 706 706 
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0 
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Table 17 Linear probability model with fixed effect for the south 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Retired in 
south  
Retired in 
south  
Retired in 
south  
Retired in 
south  
Retired in 
south  
Retired in 
south  
       
Age 0.282*** 0.302** 0.305** 0.302** 0.301** 0.305** 
 (0.093) (0.126) (0.126) (0.126) (0.125) (0.126) 
Age^2 -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Self-employed 0.045 0.067 0.064 0.068 0.071 0.072 
 (0.075) (0.097) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) (0.096) 
Partner with job -0.036 0.016 0.010 0.016 0.023 0.020 
 (0.084) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) (0.099) 
Marital status 1.139*** 1.180*** 1.188*** 1.183*** 1.185*** 1.183*** 
 (0.273) (0.287) (0.286) (0.287) (0.285) (0.286) 
Widow/widower 1.165*** 1.250*** 1.274*** 1.255*** 1.299*** 1.294*** 
 (0.306) (0.334) (0.333) (0.334) (0.333) (0.334) 
Offspring 0.044 0.060 0.058 0.060 0.061 0.062 
 (0.058) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) 
No. of family members 0.023 0.027 0.033 0.029 0.022 0.028 
 (0.040) (0.057) (0.056) (0.057) (0.056) (0.056) 
Primary school 0.021 0.014 0.018 0.014 0.020 0.017 
 (0.133) (0.173) (0.173) (0.173) (0.172) (0.173) 
Middle school -0.069 -0.029 -0.040 -0.035 -0.050 -0.049 
 (0.120) (0.158) (0.156) (0.158) (0.156) (0.157) 
Replacement rate 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log of real wealth 0.033* 0.051** 0.052** 0.052** 0.049** 0.049** 
 (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
Log of financial wealth 0.047*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 
 (0.014) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
Log of individual income -0.075 -0.088 -0.086 -0.089 -0.082 -0.083 
 (0.048) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
All correct answers  0.003     
  (0.041)     
One correct answer   -0.042    
   (0.037)    
Two correct answers    0.008   
    (0.036)   
All “Don’t know”     0.073  
     (0.054)  
All wrong answers      0.059 
      (0.051) 
Constant -10.299*** -11.337** -11.545*** -11.372** -11.431*** -11.548*** 
 (3.239) (4.399) (4.385) (4.400) (4.375) (4.385) 
Observations 1,040 861 861 861 861 861 
R-squared 0.172 0.207 0.213 0.207 0.215 0.213 
Number of pid 788 678 678 678 678 678 
       
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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7 Financial literacy and expected age of retirement under a (partial) 
DC formula 
The results in the regressions described above show that financial literacy is positively associated 
with an earlier exit from the labor market, i.e. negatively associated with retirement age. As already 
mentioned, we think it reasonable to relate the association to the working of the DB formula, and more 
specifically to the penalization on the continuation of work that is implicit in the formula.  
These results cannot, therefore, be extended to the behavior of younger family heads who belong (at 
least in pro-rata) to the DC system, which does not contain this implicit taxation (or it does at a lower rate).  
For these younger cohorts, our hypothesis is that the correlation between financial literacy and retirement age 
is either positive (showing that people understand the actuarially fair increase in their pension wealth and are 
available to continue in the retirement savings program); or weak/non-existent, when other factors of the 
decision process (such as consideration of whether the spouse/partner is still working) are more important 
that the “wealth effect”.    
To test our hypothesis, we restrict the sample to family heads less than fifty years of age, so that we 
are able to capture working people who will retire at least partially under the DC method. As a consequence, 
we get a sample composed by 991 observations. We run then the same linear probability model with fixed 
effects for the whole sample, splitting the sample between male and female, and according to area of 
residence (the north, center, and south).  
In this specification, our dependent variable is the expected age of retirement; as independent 
variables, we use the same set of regressors as before; in particular, we include the financial literacy 
variables. We expect, thus, to see that financial knowledge increases the expected age of retirement. 
Table 18 shows that our expectations are confirmed. The individuals who answered all the questions 
correctly are associated with a higher expected retirement age in the whole sample as well as in the sample of 
people living in the southern region. The effect is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. This shows 
that the incentive to stay longer in the labor market is embedded in the DC system, and that people belonging 
to the DB system were driving the outcomes of the previous regressions.  
The individuals who answered only two questions correctly are associated with a lower expected 
retirement age in the whole sample; the same is true for women and for people living in the south of Italy. 
Therefore, it appears that only those who are financially literate have a good understanding about decisions 
connected with retirement, and, as consequence, respond to the cancellation of incentives to exit the labor 
market as soon as the minimum required are met.  
 
 
Table 18 Impact of financial literacy on expected age of retirement, linear probability model with fixed 
effects 
 
Whole sample Male sample Female sample 
Northern 
region Central region 
Southern 
region 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
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Expected age 
of retirement 
Expected age 
of retirement 
Expected age 
of retirement 
Expected age 
of retirement 
Expected age 
of retirement 
Expected age 
of retirement 
 
      
All correct answers 1.228** 0.822 1.512 1.108 0.765 1.891** 
 
(0.541) (0.575) (1.001) (0.971) (0.988) (0.861) 
One correct answer 0.450 0.754 1.113 1.222 -2.607* 0.809 
 
(0.645) (0.895) (0.956) (0.920) (1.479) (0.908) 
Two correct answers -0.846* -0.818 -1.306** -1.129 0.194 -1.731** 
 
(0.474) (0.706) (0.629) (0.745) (1.006) (0.798) 
All “Don’t know” -1.819 -0.318 -6.727 -3.710 0.256 -1.604 
 
(2.284) (1.349) (7.370) (4.898) (1.713) (2.111) 
All wrong answers -1.061 -0.701 -2.151 -1.299 -1.892 -0.781 
 
(1.167) (0.881) (3.396) (1.952) (2.174) (1.257) 
 
   
 
  
Observations 1377 763 614 673 292 412 
  
 
    
Notes: Each group of cells show the results from separate regressions, with a common specification across the columns: all heads of 
family below 50 years old, all men satisfying the same age criteria, all women in the same age group, all heads of family living in the 
northern region, then in the central region, and finally in the southern region aged below 50 years. Additional controls include time 
dummies, education, log of real wealth, log of financial wealth, log of individual income, expected replacement rate, number of 
household members, marital status, and whether the partner is working. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
8. Conclusions 
Retirement decisions are strongly influenced by the pension formulae and by workers’ understanding 
of their functioning, which is connected to financial literacy. Workers understand that the DB system (as 
applied in Italy) penalizes the continuation of the activity and tend consequently to access an early retirement 
option. With the DC formula, conversely, this will no longer be true and the decision will not only become 
more “individualized” but also more dependent on personal, economic and family circumstances. In the new 
setting, understanding the basic principles and mechanics of pension wealth accumulation and decumulation 
will represent a pre-requisite for good decisions. A good understanding, however, is hardly possible when 
financial illiteracy is widespread.  
Our study can be considered a first contribution to the analysis of whether and how financial literacy 
influences the retirement choice. More specifically the study exploits new questions about financial literacy - 
recently introduced into the Bank of Italy SHIW - to investigate the distribution of financial literacy among 
the Italian population, and its impact on retirement decisions. We also try to highlight gender and 
geographical differences.  
Our results show that workers answering all questions correctly are more likely to retire when 
eligible. These results are consistent with the disincentive implicit in the DB method of calculating benefits.  
To consider the role of the DC formula, we restrict the analysis of the effect of financial literacy on 
the expected age of retirement for heads of family who are under fifty and thus partly or exclusively under 
the new regime. Our expectations that workers performing better in financial literacy tests are more likely to 
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prolong their working activity are confirmed. Indirectly, this supports the hypothesis that the previous 
outcome (a negative correlation between financial literacy and retirement age) was mainly driven by 
workers’ understanding of the reduction in their pension wealth  they incur into when they delay retirement  
after having reached eligibility. These results are somewhat encouraging as to the effects of financial literacy 
on retirement choice, and on the working of the DC formula.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix  
 
Financial literacy tests: 
 
- Inflation rate: Imagine having 1,000 euros in a current account that pays 1 per cent interest and has 
no charges. Imagine also that inflation is running at 2 per cent. Do you think that if you withdraw the 
money in a year’s time, you will be able to buy the same amount of goods as if you spent the 1,000 
euros today? 
Yes — No, I will be able to buy less — No, I will be able to buy more — Don’t know — No answer  
 
- Interest rate: Imagine leaving 1,000 euros in a current account that pays 2 per cent annual interest 
and has no charges. What sum do you think will be available at the end of the second year?  
Less than 1,020 euros — Exactly 1,020 euros — More than 1,020 euros — Don’t know — No 
answer 
 
- Mortgage: With which of the following types of mortgage do you think you are able to establish 
from the beginning the maximum amount and number of instalments that you will have to pay 
before you can pay off your debt?  
Variable rate mortgage — Fixed rate mortgage — Variable rate mortgage and fixed instalments — 
Don’t know — No answer 
 
- Risk: Which of the following investment strategies do you think entails the greatest risk of losing 
your capital? 
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Investing in the shares of a single company — Investing in the shares of more than one company — 
Don’t know — No answer 
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Table 1A – Retirement Requisites in years 2006-2010    
MDB
l.243/2004 employee self-employed employee self-employed
old-age
seniority 40 years
seniority 35 years age 57 (at regime: 62)
age 58 (at regime  in 
2013: 63)
age 57 (at regime  in 2013: 
62)
age 58 (at regime  in 
2013: 63)
l.247/2007 old-age
seniority 40 years
seniority 35 years
age 58 (at regime  in 2013: 
61 and age+seniority 97)
age 59 (at regime  in 
2013: 62  and and 
age+seniority 98)
age 58 (at regime  in 2013: 
61 and age+seniority 97)
age 59 (at regime  in 
2013: 62  and and 
age+seniority 98)
NDC
l.243/2004 employee self-employed employee self-employed
old-age
seniority 40 years
seniority 35 years
age 57 (at regime in 2013:  
62) and 1.2 yearly income 
support for the elderly
age 58 (at regime in 
2013: 63) and 1.2 yearly 
income support for the 
age 57 (at regime in 2013:  
62) and 1.2 yearly income 
support for the elderly
age 58 (at regime in 
2013: 63) and 1.2 yearly 
income support for the 
l.247/2007 old-age
seniority 40 years
seniority 35 years
age 62 and benefit>=1.2 
yearly income support for 
the elderly
age 63 and benefit>=1.2 
yearly income support 
for the elderly
age 62 and benefit>=1.2 
yearly income support for 
the elderly
age 63 and benefit>=1.2 
yearly income support 
for the elderly
no further requirement
men women
age 65 
age 60 and benefit>=1.2 yearly income support for 
the elderly
no further requirement
age 65 
age 60 and benefit>=1.2 yearly income support for 
the elderly
no further requirement
womenmen
no further requirement
age 65, seniority 20 age 60, seniority 20
age 65, seniority 20 age 60, seniority 20
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Table 2A Sum statistics of regressors in table 12 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
 
     
Retired 4758 0.874 0.331 0 1 
Age 4758 65.960 5.526 48 75 
Age^2 4758 4,381.264 723.710 2304 5625 
Self-employed 4758 0.179 0.383 0 1 
Partner with job 4758 0.121 0.326 0 1 
      
 
     
Marital status 4758 0.700 0.457 0 1 
Widower 4758 0.154 0.361 0 1 
Divorced 4758 0.058 0.234 0 1 
Offspring 4758 0.674 0.468 0 1 
No. of family members 4758 2.217 0.967 1 8 
      
 
     
Primary school 4758 0.348 0.476 0 1 
Middle school 4758 0.291 0.454 0 1 
High school 4758 0.193 0.395 0 1 
University 4758 0.063 0.243 0 1 
Replacement rate 4758 74.414 16.164 0 150 
 
     
 
     
Log of real wealth 4758 11.803 1.823 0 16.588 
Log of financial wealth 4758 9.532 1.474 2.708 15.442 
Log of individual 
income 4758 10.031 0.489 7.607 12.965 
All correct answers 3920 0.345 0.475 0 1 
One correct answer 3920 0.194 0.395 0 1 
      
 
     
Two correct answers 3920 0.354 0.478 0 1 
All “Don’t know” 3920 0.068 0.252 0 1 
All wrong answers 3920 0.105 0.307 0 1 
 
 
Table 3A Sum statistics for regressors in table 13, male sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
     
Retired 3457 0.866 0.339 0 1 
Age 3457 65.726 5.572 48 75 
Age^2 3457 4,350.995 728.585 2304 5625 
Self-employed 3457 0.188 0.390 0 1 
Partner with job 3457 0.153 0.360 0 1 
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Marital status 3457 0.839 0.367 0 1 
Widower 3457 0.065 0.247 0 1 
Divorced 3457 0.037 0.189 0 1 
Offspring 3457 0.693 0.461 0 1 
No. of family members 
3457 2.409 0.941 1 8 
 
     
Primary school 3457 0.335 0.472 0 1 
Middle school 3457 0.309 0.462 0 1 
High school 3457 0.196 0.397 0 1 
University 3457 0.061 0.239 0 1 
Replacement rate 3457 75.094 15.592 0 130 
 
     
Log of real wealth 3457 11.885 1.781 0 16.588 
Log of financial wealth 3457 9.597 1.475 2.708 15.442 
Log of individual 
income 3457 10.086 0.485 7.743 12.965 
All correct answers 2820 0.366 0.481 0 1 
One correct answer 2820 0.186 0.389 0 1 
 
     
Two correct answers 2820 0.353 0.478 0 1 
All “Don’t know” 2820 0.056 0.230 0 1 
All wrong answers 2820 0.093 0.290 0 1 
 
Table 4A Sum statistics for regressors in table 14, female sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
     
Retired 1301 0.893 0.308 0 1 
Age 1301 66.581 5.354 48 75 
Age^2 1301 4,461.694 704.576 2304 5625 
Self-employed 1301 0.157 0.364 0 1 
Partner with job 1301 0.035 0.184 0 1 
 
     
Marital status 1301 0.332 0.471 0 1 
Widower 1301 0.391 0.488 0 1 
Divorced 1301 0.113 0.317 0 1 
Offspring 1301 0.622 0.484 0 1 
No. of family members 
1301 1.707 0.842 1 6 
 
     
Primary school 1301 0.384 0.486 0 1 
Middle school 1301 0.244 0.429 0 1 
High school 1301 0.186 0.389 0 1 
University 1301 0.068 0.252 0 1 
Replacement rate 1301 72.606 17.470 0 150 
 
     
Log of real wealth 1301 11.583 1.915 3.912 16.176 
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Log of financial wealth 1301 9.359 1.459 3.660 13.810 
Log of individual 
income 1301 9.882 0.470 7.607 12.091 
All correct answers 1100 0.290 0.453 0 1 
One correct answer 1100 0.213 0.410 0 1 
 
     
Two correct answers 1100 0.359 0.479 0 1 
All “Don’t know” 1100 0.100 0.301 0 1 
All wrong answers 1100 0.137 0.344 0 1 
 
 
 
Table 5A Sum statistics for regressors in table 15, North Italy sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
     
Retired 2604 0.879 0.326 0 1 
Age 2604 65.812 5.651 48 75 
Age^2 2604 4,363.171 739.679 2304 5625 
Self-employed 2604 0.193 0.395 0 1 
Partner with job 2604 0.127 0.333 0 1 
 
     
Marital status 2604 0.680 0.466 0 1 
Widower 2604 0.163 0.369 0 1 
Divorced 2604 0.072 0.260 0 1 
Offspring 2604 0.663 0.472 0 1 
No. of family members 2604 2.122 0.898 1 6 
 
     
Primary school 2604 0.344 0.475 0 1 
Middle school 2604 0.313 0.463 0 1 
High school 2604 0.187 0.390 0 1 
University 2604 0.056 0.230 0 1 
Replacement rate 2604 74.745 16.278 0 130 
 
     
Log of real wealth 2604 11.798 1.789 0 16.588 
Log of financial wealth 2604 9.742 1.454 2.708 15.442 
Log of individual 
income 2604 10.078 0.476 8.519 1.255 
All correct answers 2121 0.328 0.469 0 1 
One correct answer 2121 0.206 0.404 0 1 
 
     
Two correct answers 2121 0.383 0.486 0 1 
All “Don’t know” 2121 0.044 0.205 0 1 
All wrong answers 2121 0.082 0.274 0 1 
 
 
 
 
Table 6A Sum statistics for regressors in table 16, Center Italy sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
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Retired 1114 0.872 0.333 0 1 
Age 1114 66.133 5.261 48 75 
Age^2 1114 4,401.333 689.309 2304 5625 
Self-employed 1114 0.157 0.364 0 1 
Partner with job 1114 0.114 0.317 0 1 
 
     
Marital status 1114 0.701 0.457 0 1 
Widower 1114 0.146 0.353 0 1 
Divorced 1114 0.053 0.225 0 1 
Offspring 1114 0.666 0.471 0 1 
No. of family members 
1114 2.280 1.038 1 8 
 
     
Primary school 1114 0.379 0.485 0 1 
Middle school 1114 0.259 0.438 0 1 
High school 1114 0.204 0.403 0 1 
University 1114 0.061 0.239 0 1 
Replacement rate 1114 75.712 16.148 0 150 
 
     
Log of real wealth 1114 12.058 1.840 3.218 15.529 
Log of financial wealth 1114 9.478 1.530 3.660 13.958 
Log of individual 
income 1114 10.078 0.486 8.175 12.634 
All correct answers 938 0.436 0.496 0 1 
One correct answer 938 0.150 0.357 0 1 
 
     
Two correct answers 938 0.301 0.459 0 1 
All “Don’t know” 938 0.078 0.269 0 1 
All wrong answers 938 0.111 0.315 0 1 
 
 
 
Table 7A Sum statistics for regressors in table 17, South Italy sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
     
Retired 1040 0.864 .3425035 0 1 
Age 1040 66.144 5.480 48 75 
Age^2 1040 4,405.069 718.658 2304 5625 
Self-employed 1040 0.169 0.375 0 1 
Partner with job 1040 0.113 0.317 0 1 
 
     
Marital status 1040 0.749 0.433 0 1 
Widower 1040 0.142 0.349 0 1 
Offspring 1040 0.708 0.454 0 1 
No. of family members 
1040 2.387 1.024 1 6 
Primary school 1040 0.327 0.469 0 1 
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Middle school 1040 0.272 0.445 0 1 
Replacement rate 1040 72.196 15.684 1 110 
Log of real wealth 1040 11.540 1.855 4.605 14.762 
Log of financial wealth 1040 9.065 1.344 4.605 13.491 
Log of individual 
income 1040 9.860 0.486 7.607 12.965 
 
     
All correct answers 861 0.286 0.452 0 1 
One correct answer 
861 0.213 0.410 0 1 
Two correct answers 861 0.342 0.474 0 1 
All “Don’t know” 861 0.117 0.321 0 1 
All wrong answers 861 0.156 0.363 0 1 
 
 
 
Table 8A Sum statistics for regressors in table 18, whole sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
     
Expected age of 
retirement 1377 64.196 4.113 49 100 
Self-employed 1377 0.208 0.406 0 1 
Partner with job 1377 0.437 0.496 0 1 
Marital status 1377 0.574 0.494 0 1 
Divorced 1377 0.064 0.245 0 1 
 
     
Offspring 1377 0.031 0.173 0 1 
No. of family members 
1377 2.512 1.222 1 8 
Middle school 1377 0.179 0.383 0 1 
High school 1377 0.413 0.492 0 1 
University 1377 0.301 0.459 0 1 
 
     
Replacement rate 1377 62.111 15.382 0 100 
Log of real wealth 1377 10.531 2.519 0 15.177 
Log of financial wealth 1377 8.929 1.356 10.720 13.661 
Log of individual 
income 1377 9.918 0.539 5.283 13.605 
Years of contributions 1377 7.976 3.245 1 14 
 
     
All correct answers 1210 0.372 0.483 0 1 
One correct answer 1210 0.184 0.387 0 1 
Two correct answers 1210 0.369 0.482 0 1 
All “Don’t know” 1210 0.037 0.189 0 1 
All wrong answers 1210 0.073 0.261 0 1 
 
     
wave      
2008 1377 0.336 0.472 0 1 
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2010 1377 0.408 0.491 0 1 
 
 
 
Table 9A Sum statistics for regressors in table 18,  male sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
     
Expected age of 
retirement 763 64.876 4.113 49 100 
Self-employed 763 0.245 0.430 0 1 
Partner with job 763 0.433 0.495 0 1 
Marital status 763 0.669 0.470 0 1 
Divorced 763 0.024 0.155 0 1 
 
     
Offspring 763 0.032 0.178 0 1 
No. of family members 
763 2.644 1.226 1 8 
Middle school 763 0.211 0.408 0 1 
High school 763 0.410 0.492 0 1 
University 763 0.263 0.440 0 1 
 
     
Replacement rate 763 62.293 15.745 0 100 
Log of real wealth 763 10.659 2.514 0 15.177 
Log of financial wealth 763 8.965 1.336 5.491 13.661 
Log of individual 
income 763 10.005 0.526 5.283 13.606 
Years of contributions 763 8.128 3.068 1 14 
 
     
All correct answers 670 0.385 0.486 0 1 
One correct answer 670 0.182 0.386 0 1 
Two correct answers 670 0.362 0.481 0 1 
All “Don’t know” 670 0.035 0.185 0 1 
All wrong answers 670 0.070 0.255 0 1 
 
     
wave      
2008 763 0.359 0.480 0 1 
2010 763 0.364 0.481 0 1 
 
 
Table 10A Sum statistics for regressors in table 18, female sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
     
Expected age of 
retirement 614 63.351 3.957 50 100 
Self-employed 614 0.162 0.369 0 1 
Partner with job 614 0.441 0.496 0 1 
Marital status 614 0.456 0.498 0 1 
Divorced 614 0.114 0.318 0 1 
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Offspring 614 0.029 0.168 0 1 
No. of family members 
614 2.348 1.199 1 6 
Middle school 614 0.140 0.347 0 1 
High school 614 0.416 0.493 0 1 
University 614 0.348 0.476 0 1 
 
     
Replacement rate 614 61.885 14.928 0 100 
Log of real wealth 614 10.372 2.517 3.912 14.743 
Log of financial wealth 614 8.884 1.380 1.072 12.747 
Log of individual 
income 614 9.810 0.536 6.291 12.021 
Years of contributions 614 7.786 3.446 1 14 
 
     
All correct answers 540 0.357 0.479 0 1 
One correct answer 540 0.187 0.390 0 1 
Two correct answers 540 0.377 0.485 0 1 
All “Don’t know” 540 0.038 0.193 0 1 
All wrong answers 540 0.077 0.268 0 1 
 
     
wave      
2008 614 0.307 0.461 0 1 
2010 614 0.464 0.499 0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11A Sum statistics for regressors in table 18, North Italy sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
     
Expected age of 
retirement 673 63.753 4.269 49 99 
Self-employed 673 0.179 0.384 0 1 
Partner with job 673 0.429 0.495 0 1 
Marital status 673 0.514 0.500 0 1 
Divorced 673 0.068 0.252 0 1 
 
     
Offspring 673 0.037 0.189 0 1 
No. of family members 
673 2.301 1.225 1 8 
Middle school 673 0.163 0.370 0 1 
High school 673 0.410 0.492 0 1 
University 673 0.295 0.456 0 1 
 
     
Replacement rate 673 61.063 14.889 0 100 
Log of real wealth 673 10.254 2.580 0 14.848 
Log of financial wealth 673 8.980 1.343 4.798 13.661 
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Log of individual 
income 673 9.941 0.506 6.357 11.875 
Years of contributions 673 8.271 3.255 1 14 
 
     
All correct answers 588 0.340 0.474 0 1 
One correct answer 588 0.185 0.388 0 1 
Two correct answers 588 0.397 0.489 0 1 
All “Don’t know” 588 0.032 0.176 0 1 
All wrong answers 588 0.076 0.266 0 1 
 
     
wave      
2008 673 0.344 0.475 0 1 
2010 673 0.383 0.486 0 1 
 
 
 
 
Table 12A Sum statistics for regressors in table 18, Center Italy sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
     
Expected age of 
retirement 292 64.441 3.995 50 90 
Self-employed 292 0.195 0.397 0 1 
Partner with job 292 0.472 0.500 0 1 
Marital status 292 0.551 0.498 0 1 
Divorced 292 0.068 0.253 0 1 
 
     
Offspring 292 0.027 0.163 0 1 
No. of family members 
292 2.561 1.204 1 6 
Middle school 292 0.160 0.368 0 1 
High school 292 0.349 0.477 0 1 
University 292 0.369 0.483 0 1 
 
     
Replacement rate 292 62.976 16.841 10 100 
Log of real wealth 292 10.877 2.522 3.912 15.068 
Log of financial wealth 292 9.095 1.456 3.912 12.747 
Log of individual 
income 292 9.990 0.671 5.283 1.360 
Years of contributions 292 7.883 3.293 1 14 
 
     
All correct answers 259 0.498 0.500 0 1 
One correct answer 259 0.108 0.311 0 1 
Two correct answers 259 0.316 0.466 0 1 
All “Don’t know” 259 0.046 0.210 0 1 
All wrong answers 259 0.077 0.267 0 1 
 
     
wave      
2008 292 0.297 0.458 0 1 
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2010 292 0.493 0.500 0 1 
 
 
 
Table 13A Sum statistics for regressors in Table 18, South Italy sample 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
     
Expected age of 
retirement 412 64.747 3.856 55 100 
Self-employed 412 0.264 0.441 0 1 
Partner with job 412 0.424 0.494 0 1 
Marital status 412 0.689 0.463 0 1 
Divorced 412 0.055 0.229 0 1 
 
     
Offspring 412 0.024 0.154 0 1 
No. of family members 
412 2.822 1.163 1 7 
Middle school 412 0.218 0.413 0 1 
High school 412 0.463 0.499 0 1 
University 412 0.262 0.440 0 1 
 
     
Replacement rate 412 63.211 15.011 0 100 
Log of real wealth 412 10.738 2.366 460.517 1.517.777 
Log of financial wealth 412 8.727 1.281 1.072 13.017 
Log of individual 
income 412 9.831 0.474 6.291 11.261 
Years of contributions 412 7.558 3.151 1 14 
 
     
All correct answers 363 0.336 0.473 0 1 
One correct answer 363 0.236 0.425 0 1 
Two correct answers 363 0.360 0.480 0 1 
All “Don’t know” 363 0.038 0.192 0 1 
All wrong answers 363 0.066 0.248 0 1 
 
     
wave      
2008 412 0.349 0.477 0 1 
2010 412 0.390 0.488 0 1 
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